



CESIFO WORKING PAPER NO. 873
CATEGORY 1: PUBLIC FINANCE
FEBRUARY 2003
An electronic version of the paper may be downloaded
• from the SSRN website: www.SSRN.com




When information on longevity (survival functions) is unknown early in life, individuals have
an interest to insure themselves against future ’risk-class’ classification. Accordingly, the
First-Best typically involves transfers across states of nature. Competitive equilibrium cannot
provide such transfers if insurance firms are unable to precommit their customers. On the
other hand, public insurance plans that do not distinguish between ’risk-class’ realizations are
also inefficient. It is impossible, a-priori, to rank these alternatives from a welfare point of
view.
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This paper was presented at the CESifo conference on Pensions, Munich, May 2-3, 2001.1 Demand for Annuities
Consider an individual who wants to decide on his or her optimum consumption at
diﬀerent ages and choose an age for retirement in the presence of uncertainty about the
length of life. Assume at ﬁr s tt h a tt h i su n c e r t a i n t yi sr e p r e s e n t e db yak n o w nsurvival
distribution function, F(z), which is the probability to survive to age z. Subsequently
we shall analyze the more realistic case of uncertain survival probabilities early in life.
Let T be maximum lifetime.1 Then, F(0) = 1, F(T)=0and F(z) is non-increasing
in z.
Assume that f(z), the density of 1−F(z) (the probability of dying at age z), exists
for all z, 0 ≤ z ≤ T. Consumption at age z is denoted by c(z). Utility of consumption,
u(c), is independent of age, increasing in c, and displays risk aversion (u0(c) > 0 and
u00(c) < 0). When working, the individual provides one unit of labor. Disutility of work,
a(z), is independent of consumption and increasing with age (a0(z) > 0).C o n t i n g e n to n
survival, individuals work between age zero and R, i.e. retirement occurs at R.









Let wages at age z be w(z). Savings, w(z) − c(z), whether positive or negative,
are assumed to incur a zero rate of interest.2
With no bequest motive, individuals save only in order to ﬁnance consumption,
particularly during retirement. This is achieved eﬃc i e n t l yb yc o n t i n u o u s l ya n n u i t i z i n g
savings through the purchase of ’deferred-annuities’ that will start payments upon re-
tirement (Sheshinski (1999)).






F(z)w(z)dz =0 . (2)
1Formally, it is possible to allow T = ∞.
2It is well-known how to modify the results for positive rates of interest and subjective discount rates.
2Maximization of (1) subject to (2) yields an optimum constant consumption ﬂow,


















The condition for optimum retirement is written:
φ(R) − a(R)=0 (4)
where φ(R)=u0(c∗(R))w(R) is the additional utility from a small postponement of
retirement. Condition (4) determines optimum retirement so as to balance these beneﬁts
against instantaneous labor disutility, a(R).W ea s s u m e t h a t w0(R) ≤ 0. This ensures
that (4) has a unique solution, denoted R∗,w h i c hs a t i s ﬁes second-order conditions.4






























where σ = −
u00(c)c
u0(c)
> 0. This condition clearly holds when w0(R) ≤ 0.
32 ’Risk-Classes’: Ranking of Survival Functions
Individuals who share a common survival function are called a ’risk-class’. We
want to consider a population that consists of a number of risk-classes and analyze the
implications of alternative annuity pricing schemes in the presence of such heterogeneity.
It will be useful ﬁrst to formalize the notion that one survival function has a shorter
life-span or is more ’risky’ than another. Our approach is a direct application of the
theory of Stochastic-Dominance.
2.1 Ranking of Survival Function
Consider two survival functions, F1(z) and F2(z), 0 ≤ z ≤ T, both satisfying
Fi(0) = 1, Fi(T)=0and Fi(z) non-increasing in z, i =1 ,2. The conditional probability
of dying at age z,
fi(z)
Fi(z)
,i st e r m e dt h e’Hazard-Rate’ of Fi(z).
Deﬁnition 1.( ’Single Crossing’ or ’Stochastic-Dominance’): The function F1(z)






, 0 ≤ z ≤ T. (6)







smaller at all ages with distribution 1 than with 2.





, 0 ≤ z ≤ T, i =1 ,2. Being positive and their integral over (0,T)e q u a l











































. Hence, there can be only a single crossing. That is, there exists










as z S zc. (7)
Intuitively, (7) means that the dominant (dominated) distribution has higher (lower)
survival rates, relative to life expectancy, at older (younger) ages.











i.e., stochastic dominance implies higher life expectancy.
2.2 Risk-Class Pricing of Annuities
Suppose that the population consist of two risk classes represented by survival
functions Fi(z), i =1 ,2. Otherwise individuals are identical (i.e., same preferences and
incomes). Assume that group 1’s survival function stochastically dominates, according
to (6), that of group 2. In particular, group 1 has a higher life expectancy. In a perfectly
competitive market, when ﬁrms can identify annuity purchasers according to the risk-
class to which they belong, the analysis in section 2 applies to each group separately.
This leads us to the following:






































5for all R, 0 <R<T . I tf o l l o w sf r o m( 4 )t h a tφ1(R) > φ2(R) and hence, since
a0(R) > 0,t h a tR∗
1 >R ∗






When wages are the same for all individuals, those with higher life expectancy par-
tially compensate for higher longevity by retiring later, but their optimum consumption
remains lower throughout.
3 Uncertain Future Survival Functions
The assumption that uncertainly in lifetime duration is represented by a known
survival function is not realistic. Survival probabilities are diﬃcult to predict, partic-
ularly early in life, since they depend on health and other circumstances which only
unfold overtime. Accordingly, we shall now assume that early in life individuals do not
know to what risk class they will belong later on. Consequently, they have an interest
in insurance against alternative risk classiﬁcations later in life. Such insurance typically
involves transfers across diﬀerent risk classes (’states of nature’) and is actuarially fair
on average.
Risk classes with higher than average life expectancy face unfavorably priced an-
nuities while the others face favorably priced annuities. It is desirable to have ex-ante
insurance that allows consumption levels and retirement ages to deviate from those that
would be chosen when annuity prices are actuarially fair for each risk class separately.5
We model the uncertainty about future risk classiﬁcation as follows. All individ-
uals have the same known survival function, F(z), between ages zero to M, well before
retirement. At that age, there is a probability p, 0 <p<1, that the survival function
becomes F1(z) and 1 − p that it becomes F2(z).
Assuming that preferences do not vary with the realized risk class, expected lifetime
utility is
5More generally, this applies not only to retirement but to other labor supply attributes (e.g., hours






















where ci(z),M≤ z ≤ T, and Ri are consumption and retirement age under





















Maximization of (10) subject to (11) yields optimum consumption, which is con-
stant at all ages and across states: c(z)=c1(z)=c2(z)=c∗. Similarly, optimum
retirement ages are equal for both risk classes: R1 = R2 = R. By (11), c∗ is given, in


























Fi(z)w(z)dz is expected wages until retirement in state i,a n dβ =
pz1
pz1 +( 1− p)z2
,
0 < β < 1. Optimum retirement age, R∗,i sd e t e r m i n e d ,a sb e f o r e ,b yc o n d i t i o n( 4 ) .
We state this result in the following:
Proposition 2. When preferences are independent of survival function realiza-
tions, optimum consumption is uniform and retirement ages are identical for all risk
classes.
The optimum described above entails transfers across risk classes.
7Let T ∗
i be the optimum transfer to risk-class i,d e ﬁned as the excess of expected
consumption over expected wages from age M to T less expected total savings, S∗, during





































By (7), transfers to the stochastically dominant (dominated) group are positive
(negative), T∗
1 > 0(T ∗
2 < 0). The break-even constraint (11) entails that total expected
transfers are zero: pT∗
1 +( 1− p)T ∗
2 =0 .
4 Competitive Markets: Risk-Class Pricing without
Transfers
We have seen that the First-Best allocation entails transfers across risk-classes.
Competitive insurance markets can implement such a scheme provided that insurance
ﬁrms can precommit their customers, prior to ’risk-class’ realization, to stay-on until
retirement. This is not plausible. Firms will successfully lure individuals with a short
life expectancy, oﬀering them actuarially fair annuities with no transfers to other groups.
Consequently, in the absence of transfers between risk-classes, individuals at early ages
ﬁnd themselves not being insured against alternative risk classiﬁcations at later ages.
We want to study the implications of this market failure.








Fi(z)a(z)dz, i =1 ,2. (15)







Fi(z)w(z)dz − S =0 ,i =1 ,2, (16)
where S, savings during ages zero to M, are the same for both risk classes. As be-
fore, maximization of (15) subject to (16) yields optimum consumption, which is constant
at all ages: ci(z)=b ci, M ≤ z ≤ T.B y( 1 6 ) ,







,i =1 ,2. (17)
Optimal retirement age, denoted b Ri(S), is determined by the condition:
φi(Ri,S) − a(Ri)=0 ,i =1 ,2, (18)
where φi(Ri,S)=u0(b ci(Ri,S))w(Ri). At the optimum, with b ci(b Ri(S),S) and








F(z)u(c(z))dz + pb V1(S)+( 1− p)b V2(S). (19)








yields constant optimum consumption c(z)=b c, 0 ≤ z ≤ M,where, by (20)








Optimum savings has to satisfy the condition:
u
0(b c)=pu
0(b c1)+( 1− p)u
0(b c2) (22)
At the optimum, marginal utility of consumption between age zero and M is a
weighted average of optimum marginal utility of consumption of the two risk classes.
Since F1(z) stochastically dominates F2(z),i ti ss e e nf r o m( 1 7 )t h a tf o ra n yR and
S, b c1(R,S) < b c2(R,S). This implies, in turn, that φ1(R,S) > φ2(R,S). It now follows
from condition (18) that b R1 > b R2 and (since w0(R) ≤ 0)t h a tb c1(b R1,S) < b c2(b R,S).
We summarize:
Proposition 3: Risk class pricing without transfers implies that at the optimum,
b c1 < b c<b c2 and b R1 > b R2.
Comparing (12) with (17) - (18), it can be inferred that First-Best consumption
and retirement, (c∗,R ∗), relate to optimum consumption and retirement under risk class
pricing without transfers, (b ci, b Ri), i =1 ,2, as follows: b c1 <c ∗ < b c2 and b R1 >R ∗ >
b R2 (Figure 3). In the First-Best allocation, individuals fully insure themselves against
risk classiﬁcation via transfers across risk classes. In the absence of such transfers,
individuals with high life expectancy choose to postpone retirement, thereby partially
compensating for their lower lifetime consumption. The opposite holds for those with
low life expectancy.
Propositions 2 and 3 imply that when preferences are independent of survival
function realizations, optimum risk class pricing without transfers is inferior to optimum
uniform annuity prices. Importantly, this suggests that social security systems which
provide uniform beneﬁts to retirees with the same earnings history and the same retire-
ment age are preferred to private annuity markets which do not provide transfers across
risk-classes. We now want to explore whether this conclusion changes when preferences
depend on survival function realizations.
105 Welfare Ranking of Uniform vs. Risk-Class An-
nuity Systems
The ineﬃciency of risk-class pricing without transfers depends crucially on indi-
viduals’ desirability to maintain, after the arrival of information about their ’risk-class’
classiﬁcation an optimum level of consumption and retirement age independent of risk-
class. Such invariance entails positive and negative transfers across risk-classes. This
result does not carry-over to the case when utility functions are state dependent.
Consider, for example, the case when disutility from work depends on the state of
nature. Thus, let ai(z) be this disutility in state i, i =1 ,2. When F1(z) stochastically
dominates F2(z), it is natural to assume that a1(z) <a 2(z), for all z ≥ M.6
Assuming that utility from consumption is independent of the state of nature, it























i)=0 ,i =1 ,2. (24)
It is easy to see from (23) - (24) that R∗
1 >R ∗
2.









,t h a ti s ,o nt h ed i ﬀerence in expected total
wages until retirement relative to expected lifetime. This diﬀerence can have any sign.
For example, let Fi(z)=e−αi,a n dw(z)=w. Then the First-Best has no transfers iﬀ
α1R∗
1 = α2R∗
2, i.e. if the elasticity of optimum retirement relative to expected lifetime is
unity. More generally, transfers to any group can be positive or negative depending on
the level of this elasticity.
6The relation between ai(z),f o rM ≤ z, and a(z), for 0 ≤ z ≤ M is immaterial for our discussion.
7Second-order conditions can be shown to be satisﬁed.
11In principle, therefore, when First-Best transfers are zero or negligible, a private
market for annuities without transfers will be eﬃcient. On the other hand, if a public
social security system does not allow the ﬂexibility in retirement ages implied by the
optimum, then the private market will be superior.
When utility of consumption is also state dependent then, in the First-Best,b o t h
optimum consumption levels and optimum retirement ages depend on risk-class real-
ization. Hence, a social security system which provides uniform consumption (and/or)
imposes equal retirement ages is, in general, not eﬃcient.
We are led to the following conclusion:
Proposition 4. It is impossible to rank, from a welfare point of view, an annuiti-
zation system that provides a uniform plan (of consumption and retirement) to all risk
classes and a competitive system based on risk-class pricing but without precommitment
and hence no transfers.
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